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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Appeal is from a final order (Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment) of the Third Judicial District Court of and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah (Honorable L.A. Dever). Richard G. Fordham, the
plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0). The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), transferred this Appeal to this Court. This
Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)0).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the District Court committed reversible error when it determined
that the "Fireman's Rule" prohibits Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claim
against defendant-appellee Ryan Oldroyd and, accordingly, granted
Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Standard of Review)
Summary judgment should be affirmed only if there is no genuine
dispute of material fact and only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions
for correctness. E.g., Andreini v. Hultqren, 860 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1993).
The appellate court does not defer to the trial court's ruling on appeal of a
1

grant of summary judgment. E.g., Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586,
588 (Utah App. 1993). On review of a grant of summary judgment, the
appellate court views the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
(Issue Preserved in Trial Court)
This issue was preserved in the District Court by Mr. Fordham's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
88-126) and by his counsel's oral argument, presented on March 16, 2005, in
opposition to that Motion.
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
This Appeal, in this case that stems from an incident in which

Mr. Fordham, a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, was severely injured, is from the
District Court's order granting Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment
entered pursuant to the District Court's determination that the "Fireman's Rule"
prohibits Mr. Fordham from prevailing in this litigation.
Mr. Fordham alleged, in his Complaint (R. 1-4), that Mr. Oldroyd was
negligent in connection with the subject incident of December 28, 2003 and
that, as a proximate cause of Mr. Oldroyd's alleged negligence, Mr. Fordham
has sustained substantial compensable damages. Mr. Oldroyd in his Answer
2

(R. 7-12) denied those allegations. After limited discovery, including the taking
of the depositions of Mr. Oldroyd and Mr. Fordham, Mr. Oldroyd filed his
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 39-40) and his Memorandum in support of
that Motion (R. 41-87). Mr. Fordham submitted his Memorandum in opposition
to that Motion (R. 88-126), along with a Request for Hearing and Oral
Argument (R. 127-28). Mr. Oldroyd then submitted his Reply Memorandum in
support of his Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 129-46) and his Request to
Submit for decision and his own Request for Oral Argument (R. 147-47).
Oral argument was held on Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary
Judgment on March 16, 2005. At the conclusion of that hearing the District
Court, announcing its determination that the Fireman's Rule prohibits
Mr. Fordham from maintaining this action against Mr. Oldroyd for injuries
sustained when Mr. Fordham was struck by another driver while he was at the
scene of a rollover accident caused by Mr. Oldroyd's negligence, from the
bench orally granted Mr. Oldroyd's Motion. That ruling was formalized by the
District Court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
163-64; copy set forth in the Addendum hereto at 01-02).
This Appeal ensued.

3

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On December 28, 2003, on the (eastbound) 600 South off-ramp

from 1-15, in Salt Lake City, Mr. Oldroyd allegedly operated a motor vehicle
negligently and in violation of his duty of care. R. 2; 41-42.
2.

Among other things, Mr. Oldroyd was allegedly driving too fast for

existing conditions (the roadway surface was snowy and/or icy), failed to
operate the vehicle he was operating within a single lane, and failed to keep
that vehicle under control. R. 2; 41-42. As alleged proximate results of
Mr. Oldroyd's subject negligence, Mr. Oldroyd lost control of his vehicle, that
vehicle traveled across the traffic lanes to its left, struck a snow bank on the
left (north) side of the roadway, overturned onto its top, and blocked the
northern-most off-ramp travel lane. R. 2.
3.

As alleged further proximate results of Mr. Oldroyd's subject

negligence, Mr. Fordham, a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper who had been called
to the scene, stopped his Highway Patrol vehicle for traffic control and highway
safety purposes, in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle that Mr. Oldroyd had
been operating, and was in the process of getting flares out of the trunk of his
Highway Patrol vehicle when another person operating another vehicle on the
same off-ramp encountered ice and/or snow on the roadway and lost control of
that vehicle, and that vehicle struck Mr. Fordham. R. 2-3; 42.
4

4.

As alleged further proximate results of Mr. Oldroyd's alleged

subject negligence, Mr. Fordham has sustained severe bodily injuries,
including a leg injury that nearly resulted in amputation; has sustained
substantial lost income and earning capacity; has sustained substantial
impairment and disability; has experienced substantial physical and emotional
pain and suffering; has sustained substantial disfigurement; has sustained
substantial loss of, and diminution of, enjoyment of various life activities; has
incurred substantial health care expenses; has sustained a substantial loss of
his pre-incident ability to provide household services; has sustained and
incurred additional "special" and "general" damages; and will, in the future,
sustain and incur substantial additional such damages, all to his damage in
compensable and reasonable amounts to be determined by the jury herein.
R. 3.
5.

Prior to filing this action, Mr. Fordham settled with the driver of the

vehicle that struck him for her liability insurance policy limits of $50,000.
6.

Mr. Fordham was also eligible for, and has received, workers

compensation benefits.
7.

Mr. Oldroyd has acknowledged that, as he came down the hill

from the off-ramp, he encountered "black ice," lost control momentarily, then
regained control, then lost control again, then slid, fishtailing across other
5

lanes of traffic, and his car then hit a snow bank piled up against the barrier on
the left (north) side of the road and flipped over. R. 156-57.
8.

Mr. Oldroyd saw the other vehicle striking Mr. Fordham. R. 158.

9.

It appeared to Mr. Oldroyd that the experience that the driver of

the vehicle that struck Mr. Fordham had with the roadway was not exactly like
his but similar to his, and he believes that the other driver encountered the
same problem on the roadway that he had encountered and that the other
driver's experience occurred within about one-half hour of the time that his
rollover incident had occurred. R. 158-59.
10.

Mr. Oldroyd saw approximately five cars slipping or sliding on the

roadway between the time of his rollover incident and the time the driver
whose vehicle struck Mr. Fordham came along, and those cars seemed to
have about the same kind of initial reaction that his car had had at about the
same spots on the roadway. R. 159-60.
11.

Those other drivers were able to regain control of their vehicles

without coming clear across the roadway and striking the snow bank on the left
side and were able to regain control of their vehicles and just keep going down
the hill, and there was a mix of SUVs and passenger cars among those
vehicles. R. 160.

6

12.

Mr. Oldroyd had encountered black ice and slush in his previous

driving experience and knew from his driving experience that, if one
encountered black ice or slush, there was a potential for one's losing control
and sliding and perhaps striking a snow bank and perhaps overturning and
perhaps losing control and hitting other vehicles or persons in the way. R.
160-61.
13.

It is Mr. Oldroyd's understanding that Mr. Fordham was among

the officers who arrived at the scene to investigate and assist with
Mr. Oldroyd's accident. R. 163.
14.

Mr. Oldroyd knew prior to the time of the subject incident that, if

he should lose control and get into an accident himself (a rollover or some
other kind), officers of the law would be coming to investigate and assist. R.
162.
IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The District Court committed reversible error in summarily dismissing
Mr. Fordham's claim on the basis of the so-called "Fireman's Rule."
The sole basis for Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment and the
sole basis for the District Court's granting that Motion was the Fireman's Rule,
a common-law doctrine that, where accepted and applied to facts such as
those pertinent to this case, works to prohibit injured public safety officers from
7

prevailing in personal injury actions against those whose negligence causes
them to be, in the exercise of their job duties, at the scene of incidents in which
they are injured. The Fireman's Rule has been accepted, to varying degrees
and in various forms, by the courts of many jurisdictions. It has also been
rejected outright, or limited in its ambit, in ways that would not prohibit
Mr. Fordham from prevailing on his claims against Mr. Oldroyd, by courts of
other jurisdictions.
This case presents, in Utah, an important issue of first impression.
Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court appears ever to have
addressed the question of whether a public safety officer (a fire or police
officer) may maintain a personal injury action against a person whose
negligence has led to that public safety officer's being present at a scene at
which he or she is subsequently injured. Neither this Court nor the Utah
Supreme Court appears ever to have addressed the question of whether
application of the Fireman's Rule is at odds with the Utah statutory scheme or
unfairly discriminates against public safety officers. This Court should rule that
the Fireman's Rule is, indeed, at odds with the Utah statutory scheme; does,
indeed, unfairly discriminate against public safety officers; and should not be
deemed to be part of the common law of the State of Utah. This Court should
reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand this case for trial.

8

V.

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ADOPTING THE FIREMAN'S RULE AND IN DETERMINING
THAT THAT RULE PROHIBITS MR. FORDHAM FROM
PURSUING HIS CLAIMS AGAINST MR. OLDROYD.

The "Fireman's Rule" is a widely rule recognized which, where it is
followed, prevents firefighters and police officers injured in the course of
their duties from recovering from those whose negligence proximately
caused their injuries or from the owner or occupant of premises who is
responsible for creating the condition requiring their presence on the
property. The Fireman's Rule has been applied to preclude recovery
against negligent motorists for injuries sustained by police officers which
were reasonably foreseeable in the course of their duties on the
highway. The rule is applicable where a police officer is responding to
or investigating an automobile accident and where an officer is injured
as a result of a motorist's actions in negligently stopping on a highway.
Am.Jur.2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic §691 (emphasis added). R. 43
(Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment).
Unlike many courts, the Utah appellate courts appear never to have
discussed the Fireman's Rule, the sole basis for Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for
Summary Judgment and the sole basis on which the District Court granted that
Motion.
It appears that there would be no other valid basis for the Motion to have
been made. First, there is, at a minimum, a question of fact as to whether
Mr. Oidroyd was negligent in losing control of his vehicle and causing it to roll
over, and Mr. Oidroyd may have conceded negligence. The Order Granting
9

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 163-64), prepared by
Mr. Oldroyd's counsel, states, in part:
Plaintiff, as a highway patrol trooper, acting in the course and scope of
his employment, cannot maintain a cause of action against Defendant
for injuries sustained when he was struck by another driver while at the
scene of a rollover accident caused by Defendant's negligence.
(Emphasis added.)
Similarly, there is, at a minimum, a question of fact as to the proximate
cause connection between Mr. Oldroyd's negligence and the injuries and
damages sustained by Mr. Fordham. Utah law is clear that an intervening
negligent act (Mr. Fordham does not dispute the proposition that the driver
who struck him was negligent) is not necessarily a superseding cause that
relieves an original actor such as Mr. Oidroyd of liability. The Utah Supreme
Court has clearly held, in Godeskv v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541, 545
(Utah 1984):
The earlier actor is charged with the foreseeable negligent acts of
others. Therefore, if the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the
earlier negligent act is a concurring [not superseding] cause.
See, also, MUJI 3.16, and other cases there cited. It is also a matter of clearly
established Utah law that the negligence of two or more persons may combine
to produce an injury and that the negligence of two or more persons may be
proximate causes of the same injury, in which case the negligent persons must
share liability, for the subject injuries and damages, in proportion to their
10

individual percentages of negligence. See, e.g., MUJI 3.15 and cases there
cited.
Given the similarities between Mr. Oldroyd's driving conduct and losing
control of his vehicle and the conduct and losing control of her vehicle of the
driver who struck Mr. Fordham, given such things as the short passage of time
between Mr. Oldroyd's conduct and that of the other driver, and given
Mr. Oldroyd's own acknowledgments (see Facts numbered 7-13, set forth at
pp. 5-7 above), there is clearly, at a minimum, a question of fact as to whether
Mr. Oldroyd's negligence, was a proximate cause of Mr. Fordham's injuries
and damages. Mr. Oldroyd apparently acknowledges the correctness of that
proposition, or else he would be expected to have contested it in his Motion for
Summary Judgment. It thus appears clear that, unless the District Court's
determination that the Fireman's Rule prohibits Mr. Fordham from maintaining
this action against Mr. Oldroyd is affirmed, Mr. Fordham should be allowed to
present his claim against Mr. Oldroyd to a jury and that the jury should be
allowed to determine the respective percentages of causal fault of Mr. Oldroyd
and the driver whose vehicle struck Mr. Fordham, as well as the amounts of
Mr. Fordham's compensable damages.
One of the underpinnings of some cases relied on by Mr. Oldroyd in the
District Court proceedings and on which Mr. Oldroyd is expected to rely in this
11

Appeal is the notion that firefighters and police officers "assume the risk" of
injuries in connection with their employment.1 It is well-established, however,
that, in Utah, assumption of risk is not an absolute defense. E.g., Moore v.
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co.. 631 P.2d 865, 868-72 (Utah 1981).
Furthermore, the basic philosophy of Utah tort law and the Liability Reform Act
of 1986, codified at Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to -43, is that each tortfeasor
must pay his, her, or its fair share of a plaintiff's damages. The Utah
Legislature has made no exception to that rule of law for public safety officers,
and there is no good reason for the courts of the State of Utah to adopt a
common law exception to that rule.
Mr. Oldroyd made much, in the District Court proceedings, of the fact
that Mr. Fordham has received workers compensation benefits, and is
expected in this Appeal to contend that that fact is somehow relevant to the
question of whether the Fireman's Rule should be adopted and applied to the
facts of this case. It is significant, with respect to that proposition, that the
Utah Legislature has determined that it is permissible for one who receives

1

The District Court's Order from which this Appeal is taken concludes with this
language:
The Court finds that the type of risk which resulted in injury to
[Mr. Fordham] is precisely the type of risk [Mr. Fordham] was hired to
confront as a highway patrol trooper, and the "Fireman's Rule" therefore
precludes [Mr. Fordham's] claim of negligence against [Mr. Oldroyd].
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workers compensation benefits to also pursue a tort claim or claims against
the person or persons whose negligence has proximately caused the injured
employee's injuries and damages. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-106 provides, in
pertinent part:
(1)

When any injury or death for which compensation is payable
under this [workers compensation] chapter... is caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an employer,
officer, agent, or employee of the employer:

(b)

the injured employee or the employee's heirs or personal
representative may have an action for damages against the
third person.

(Emphasis added.) There is no exception for fire or police officers injured in
the line of duty, and there is no sound reason for the courts of the State of
Utah to adopt a rule that would single out firefighters and public safety officers,
from the universe of private and other public actors, for discriminatory
treatment.
Cases from various jurisdictions have rejected the Fireman's Rule
outright or declined to apply it to situations like the subject situation. For
example, in Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210 (Or. 1984), the Oregon
Supreme Court, in the course of reversing a judgment in favor of the
defendant, stated, after first explaining that the basis for the Fireman's Rule
had to do with assumption of risk:
13

Implied assumption of risk in both primary and secondary forms
statutorily has been abolished in this state since 1975, and thus it can
no longer serve as an absolute bar to a plaintiff's recovery. [Citations
omitted.] That fact requires us to reexamine the "fireman's rule" to
determine whether we can still hold that a fire fighter or police officer
assumes the risk of another's negligence to the point of absolutely
barring a public safety officer from recovering in a negligence action.

When we thus reexamine the "fireman's rule," we find that its major
theoretical underpinning is gone. Therefore, because the rule is not
sustainable under implied assumption of risk analysis, we must
determine if any other supportable theory under the general rubric of
"policy" will provide the foundation for the rule. The most often cited
policy considerations include: 1) To avoid placing too heavy a burden
on premises owners to keep their premises safe from unpredictable
entrance of firefighters; 2) To spread the risk of the fire fighters' injuries
to the public through workers' compensation, salary and fringe benefits;
3) To encourage the public to call for professional help and not rely on
self-help in emergency situations; 4) To avoid increased litigation....
[Citations omitted.]
Frequently, the so-called policy reasons are merely redraped arguments
drawn from premises liability or implied assumption of risk, neither of
which are now available as legal foundations in this state. For example,
policy consideration " 1 " above focuses on the fire fighter as a class from
whom the premises owner needs immunity (akin to a licensee or
trespasser), not on the reasonableness of the activity of the premises
owner in the circumstances....
The remaining policy arguments are equally flawed. The weakness in
the loss-spreading rationale, "2" above, is obvious. By denying a public
safety officer recovery from a negligent tortfeasor, the officer is not
directed to recover his damages from the general public; rather the
officer is totally precluded from recovering these damages from anyone.
Contrast this with other public employees who are injured when
confronting dangers on their jobs. The latter can recover workers'
compensation and salary benefits from the public, but are also allowed
additional tort damages from the third-party tort-feasors. Under the

14

"fireman's rule" the injured public safety officer must bear a loss which
other public employees are not require to bear....
As for "3" above, Dean Prosser criticized as "preposterous rubbish" the
argument offered to defend the "fireman's rule" that tort liability might
deter landowners from uttering cries of distress in emergency situations.
[Citations omitted.] We agree. Furthermore we have previously
rejected "4" above, avoidance of increased litigation, as a ground for
denying substantive liability. [Citations omitted.]
As a result of statutory abolition of implied assumption of risk, we hold
that the "fireman's rule" is abolished in Oregon as a rule of law and no
longer can bar recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained by a
public safety officer, in the course of his or her employment, as a result
of a defendant's negligent conduct.
Id. at 1216-18 (emphasis added).
In Banvai v. Arruda. 799 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1990), the Colorado
Court of Appeals, in the course of reversing the dismissal of a police officer's
claim against a driver whose negligence caused a collision and caused the
officer to be present at the scene, where the officer's vehicle was rearended by
other drivers, explained:
We do not view employment as a firefighter or police officer as legal
acceptance of the negligence of others who expose the officer to injury
in connection with an automobile accident. This is especially so when
consideration is given to the fact that other public employees, like
citizens in general, remain entitled to assert their claims.

While the officer's special skills, training, and experience may be
considered with reference to any comparative negligence involved, in
our view, a per se grant of immunity to those whose negligence creates
a dangerous situation for the officer is an unwarranted departure from
15

the general duty imposed to exercise due care for the safety of others.
[Citation omitted.] Thus, we hold that a duty existed in this case for the
drivers to exercise due care towards Banyai consistent with the law of
negligence as applied in this state.
Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
One of the most eloquent statements of rejection of the Fireman's Rule
is the following, appearing in the course of the South Carolina Supreme
Court's answer to a question certified by a federal district court, in Minnich v.
Med-Waste. Inc.. 564 S.E.2d 98, 103 (S.C. 2002):
In our view, the tort law of this state adequately addresses negligence
claims brought against non-employer tortfeasors arising out of injuries
incurred by firefighters and police officers during the discharge of their
duties. We are not persuaded by any of the various rationales
advanced by those courts that recognize the firefighter's rule. The more
sound public policy -- and the one we adopt -- is to decline to
promulgate a rule singling out police officers and firefighters for
discriminatory treatment.
(Emphasis added.)
Courts of other states have declined to apply the Fireman's Rule to
situations other than those that originally gave rise to the rule (those in which
injured firemen sought to obtain tort recovery from those to whose premises
they were summoned in emergency situations and subsequently injured). In
Lave v. Neumann. 317 N.W.2d 779 (Neb. 1982), the plaintiff, a policeman, was
injured when he ran after a truck that had started moving after having been
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negligently left on the street by the defendant. The Nebraska Supreme Court
held, in the course of affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff:
The reasons which justify the application of the fireman's rule in cases
where firemen were injured in fires involving personal property are the
same reasons which support the rule in fires involving real property. A
similar analogy cannot be made as to policemen iniured while
performing their duty not on private premises.

We see no reason why, under the facts of this case, a policeman iniured
in the performance of his duty, by the negligence of another, has any
less right to be compensated for his injuries than a person not a
policeman.
Id. at 782 (emphasis added).
In Levandoski v. Cone, 841 A.2d 208 (Conn. 2004), the Connecticut
Supreme Court held, in the course of affirming a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff:
The common-law "firefighter's rule" provides, in general terms, that a
firefighter or police officer who enters private property in the exercise of
his duties occupies the status of a licensee and, therefore, is owed a
duty of care by the property owner that is less than that owed to an
ordinary invitee. [Citations omitted.] Thus, under the firefighter's rule,
the landowner generally owes the firefighter or police officer injured on
his property "only the duty not to injure him willfully or wantonly ...." The
principle issue in this appeal is whether the firefighter's rule should be
extended beyond the scope of premises liability so as to bar a police
officer from recovering, based on a claim of ordinary negligence, from a
tortfeasor who is neither an owner nor a person in control of the
premises. The defendant, who is not a landowner or a person in control
of land, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a jury trial,
in favor of the plaintiff, a police officer who was iniured by the
defendant's negligent conduct on the land of another person. We
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conclude that the firefighter's rule should not be so extended and,
accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in favor of the
plaintiff.
Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
As demonstrated by these cases, the appellate courts of the State of
Utah would not be unique in rejecting the discriminatory Fireman's Rule
outright or as applied to the facts2 of this case.
It may also be worth noting that the jurisdictions that apply the Fireman's
Rule implicitly or expressly make a distinction between those whose
negligence creates the situation to which fire or police officers respond and
those whose negligence (like that of the driver who struck Mr. Fordham) is the
more immediate cause of harm. If the Fireman's Rule is consistently applied,
based on its supposed policy underpinnings such as assumption of risk, the
officers' working for all the taxpayers, and the proposition that workers
compensation benefits are, in any event, available to public safety officers
injured on the job, there should be no such distinction; and the Fireman's Rule
should, if it is applied consistently, work to prohibit public safety officers from
suing anyone for any injuries negligently inflicted on them in the course of their

2

Mr. Fordham was injured when he was struck by a vehicle on a public
highway and not while he was fighting a fire or responding to a fire on
Mr. Oldroyd's property. The hoariest basis for invocation of the Fireman's
Rule is thus clearly lacking in this case.
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job duties. And yet no court seems to hew to the proposition that a police
officer such as Mr. Fordham is unable to proceed against a person who (like
the driver who struck Mr. Fordham) negligently injures him after he arrives at
the scene to assist in a situation caused by an earlier negligent actor such as
Mr. Oidroyd.3 This is so although there is, when one considers the concept of
creation of risk and how broadly and in how many differing situations that
concept is addressed in Utah tort law, no meaningful distinction between the
risk created by someone who negligently sets up a potentially dangerous
situation and the person whose negligence is the more immediate cause of the
injury. For a public safety officer risks his or her safety, as an inherent part of
his or her job, is paid by the taxpayers, and may recover workers
compensation benefits, regardless of whether he or she is injured by the
person whose negligence occasions his or her presence, the negligence of the
person whose vehicle strikes him or her, or a combination of both.

3

Mr. Oidroyd has so acknowledged, in his Reply Memorandum in support of
his Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted in the District Court
proceedings:
The Fireman's Rule precludes suit only against a citizen whose ordinary
negligence occasioned the presence of the public safety officer.
Independent acts of negligence that injure a safety officer at the scene,
such as the negligence of... the driver who struck and injured
Mr. Fordham, are not insulated from suit.
R. 132.
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The Fireman's Rule did not prohibit Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claim
against the driver who struck him even though one of the risks of his
employment was that he might be struck by such a person. And yet the
Fireman's Rule, as adopted and applied by the courts of some states and as
adopted and applied by the District Court in this case, works to prohibit
Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claim against Mr. Oldroyd. That inconsistency
appears to constitute another problem with the putative wisdom of the Rule
and constitutes another reason for this Court to decline to adopt it.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Fireman's Rule is at odds with the principle at the heart of Utah tort
law that each tortfeasor should bear his, her, or its fair share of responsibility,
as determined by a jury, for damages his, her, or its negligence has
proximately caused another. Also, adoption of the Rule by the appellate
courts of Utah would amount to unfair discrimination against Utah public safety
officers; the Rule does not apply to private persons and it does not apply to
other public employees. Nor do the various reasons offered in support of the
Rule appear to hold water. Assumption of the risk is not an absolute defense
but should be viewed under the umbrella of comparative fault. The fact that
Mr. Fordham, like other public safety officers injured in the course of their job
duties, is paid by the taxpayers and the fact that he has received workers
20

compensation benefits have no pertinent legal significance.

Furthermore, the

Rule's prohibition of claims against those whose negligence causes peace
officers to be at scenes where they are injured but non-prohibition of claims
against those whose negligence more directly causes injury is illustrative of its
logical weakness.
This Court should rule (for reasons such as those articulated by the
courts in Christensen (pp. 13-15), Banvai (pp. 15-16), and Minnich (p. 16),
above) that there is no need or good public policy reason for any aspect of the
Fireman's Rule to be made part of Utah common law. Alternatively, the Court
should decline to apply the Fireman's Rule to the facts of this case and rule
(similar to the holdings of the Lave and Levandoski cases discussed at pp. 1618, above) that Mr. Fordham may proceed with his claim against Mr. Oldroyd.
This Court should, in any event, reverse the Summary Judgment so that
this case may proceed to trial and so that the jury may decide questions that
jurors typically decide in personal injury negligence actions (including, if
Mr. Oldroyd cares to pursue such a contention, and if there is sufficient
evidence to support such a contention, Mr. Fordham's own supposed
negligence in doing what he was doing).
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PETER C. COLLINS, L L C .
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD G. FORDHAM,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
RYAN OLDROYD,
Defendant.

Case No. 040910717 PI
Judge L.A. Dever

THE COURT, having considered Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
dated January 7, 2005, together with memoranda submitted by counsel for all parties,
and the Court having entertained oral argument on the motion, hereby ORDERS that
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

The Court finds that

summary judgment is appropriate pursuant to the provisions of the "Fireman's Rule".
Plaintiff, as a highway patrol trooper, acting in the course and scope of his
employment, cannot maintain a cause of action against Defendant for injuries
sustained when he was struck by another driver while at the scene of a rollover
accident caused by Defendant's negligence. The Court finds that the type of risk
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which resulted in injury to the Plaintiff is precisely the type of risk Plaintiff was hired
to confront as a highway patrol trooper, and the "Fireman's Rule" therefore precludes
Plaintiff's claim of negligence against Defendant.

ORDERED this ] ^ da Y of

MWOfV^

, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

L A . Dever ' ^ ^
Third Distfkrf Cg^rtBjudge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

a
Peter C. Cfrttins, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
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